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Incentives for Product and Process Innovations:  
A Case for the Drug Industry 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We consider an interaction of competing firms in an integrated world market and study 
their R&D incentives under each of product patent and process patent regimes. We 
follow a framework generally observed in the drug industry. We show that product patent 
regime leads to a larger R&D investment. Consumers may also benefit from product 
patenting. However, if the number of goods is large enough, the choice of patent regime 
loses significance with respect to R&D incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The R&D literature discusses various issues like: incentives for R&D investment; 
R&D incentives and market structure; R&D investment and the size of the firms; 
incentives for cooperative and non-cooperative R&D; imitation, patent protection and 
R&D; etc. Broadly speaking, there are two types of innovations, product innovations and 
process innovations. A product is anything that has the capability to satisfy some specific 
need or want. So a product may be defined in terms of its ability to generate utility. 
Hence two products are different in the sense that these satisfy two different utility or 
needs. Then product innovation means either introducing altogether a new product or 
service, or substantially improving the quality of an existing product. And given a 
product in the above sense, a process innovation means innovating a new method of 
producing the product. It may mean producing exactly the same product by a superior 
method so that the marginal cost of production gets reduced if production takes place 
through this new process. The other interpretation should be innovations of the similar 
products, with different input mix, which satisfy almost the same need.  
 
The second interpretation is more closely applicable to the innovations in the 
pharmaceutical industry. To understand this, one can think of innovations of drugs to 
cure some disease. Any drug that targets a specific disease must have some basic 
components (B). So all drugs that fall in this drug group have B  as common, but they 
differ in respect of the other components (A). Therefore all drugs }{ iX  fall in the product 
group X , where ),( iXi ABXX = , that is, the i -th variety of X  uses the basic 
component XB , common to all drugs in this group, plus varying components iA ; 
mi ,...3,2,1= (say). Thus iX  and jX  are two varieties of the same drug (group X ), 
which differ in respect of using different input mix.  
 
There are in fact innumerable examples. Consider one group of antitussive drugs 
(cough suppressants) each of which contains Codeine as one important component. This 
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group includes drugs like CODOKUFF, APIDIN, BRONOLAX, CODERAN, 
CONDOMOLINDON, etc. These drugs however differ in respect of other compounds. 
CODOKUFF contains Chlorpheniramine maleate, APIDIN contains Aspirin and 
Caffeine, BRONOLAX contains Ephedrine and Diphenhydramine, CODERAN contains 
Diclofenac, and CONDOMOLINDON contains Paracetamol. Another group of 
antitussive drugs like COFORM, COFSYRYL and COREX-DX each contains 
Dextromethorphan as one common substance. In addition, COFORM contains 
Pseudoephedrine (decongestant) and Chlorpheniramine (antiallergic), COFSYRYL 
contains Pseudoephedrine and Cetirizine (antiallergic), and COREX-DX contains 
Chlorpheniramine maleate and Menthol (decongestant). Antidiarrhoeal drugs like 
ALDIAMYCIN, ALFUMET and DEEMET have common composition of Furazolidone 
(antibacterial) and Metronidazole (antiamoebic). Then ALDIAMYCIN contains, in 
addition, Belladona tincture (analgesic and antispasmodic), and DEEMET contains 
Dioxanide furoate. For treatment of migraine pain drugs like ERGOPHEN and MIGRIL 
are prescribed. These drugs have one common compound Ergotamine tartrate. In 
addition, ERGOPHEN contains Belladonna dry extract and Phenobarbitone, whereas 
MIGRIL contains Cyclizine hydrochloride and Caffeine. Antipyretic, antiallergic drugs 
like ACTICOLD and ALGI TAB contain Paracetamol and Chlorpheniramine maleate in 
common, but ACTICOLD has an additional composition Pseudoephedrine and ALGI 
TAB has Caffeine. 
 
Thus examples can be multiplied, but the basic point is that there are groups of 
drugs such that each group ( X ) contains some common components ( XB ), but within 
the group the drugs differ in respect of other components ( iA ). Then protecting 
innovation XB  is equivalent to protecting the whole group of products }{ iX . Call such 
protection as protection by product patent. On the other hand, protection of each iX  
separately means basically protecting ),( iX AB  as a whole where ),( iX AB  and ),( jX AB  
generate two close drugs with the similar/same therapeutic value. This is called process 
patenting. iX  basically denotes product X  produced by using the i -th process. Under 
process patenting we assume that each iX  (and so iA ) is distinctly different to get patent 
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under process patenting. It is in this backdrop that we examine the incentive of a firm for 
product innovations and process innovations.    
 
1.1  Motivation and Objective of the Paper 
 
Recently, countries have signed the TRIPs (trade-related intellectual property 
rights) agreement
1
 and are thus under obligations to amend their legislations in 
compatibility with the provision of TRIPs. The WTO has been set up for policing and 
enforcing the agreement. One debatable aspect of this agreement has been the 
replacement of process patents by product patents.
2
 While most of the north countries 
followed product patenting even in the pre-TRIPs era, the southern countries (e.g., India) 
mostly practiced process patenting in their domestic countries. This was particularly the 
case in pharmaceutical industries (see India’s Patent Act 1970). The southern firms 
would imitate the northern innovations by means of inventing around almost at a 
negligible cost. Hence, given the fact that most of the products are innovated in the north, 
the northern firms had the strict disadvantage to compete with the southern firms in the 
rest of the world outside the northern market. Then, introducing product patents in the 
south will obviously prevent the southern imitators from competing with the northern 
firms in the same market during the patent period. It is argued that product patenting by 
the south will provide additional R&D incentives to the innovators, thereby all countries 
will gain ultimately. 
 
1.2  Literature Survey 
 
                                                           
1
 For conceptual aspects of the international patent protection, see Maskus (1990), Subramanian (1991), 
Kabiraj (1994), and Greenaway and Sapir (1992). 
2
 Product patenting implies protection of new active compound or the good itself irrespective of the method 
by which it has been produced, whereas process patenting protects the method of production. Therefore, 
patenting products will block the development of the products by another process. 
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While there is a big literature that discusses the incentives of the south to extend 
the northern patent protection
3
, there are only a few papers in the theoretical literature 
that talk about the R&D incentives of the innovators under two types of patent regimes, 
viz., product patenting and process patenting. So our concern in this paper is to examine 
which patent regime provides a larger incentive for conducting R&D.
4
 The argument that 
is provided in favor of product patenting in the north-south structure appears to be 
misplaced, if not erroneous. The north-south models generally assume that products are 
innovated in the north, and then the southern imitators are responsible for innovating 
different processes of production for the same product.
5
 In that sense product innovations 
and process innovations seem to follow a sequence, as if they belong to two different 
classes, and then the northern innovators are assumed to have incentives for product 
patenting and the southern innovators have incentives for process patenting. But if we 
like to study logically the R&D incentives of firms under different patent regimes, we 
must look at the problem from the viewpoint of all innovators taken together.  
 
Furthermore, the existing literature seems to look at product- and process 
innovations as two distinctly different activities. But, in fact, a product innovation should 
be associated with at least one process innovation at the same time, otherwise the 
existence of the product cannot be justified (Kraft, 1990). Then it is logically possible 
that different firms simultaneously come up with the same product but with different 
processes of production. Since international patent rules are applicable to all firms 
equally, it is also reasonable to assume that the successful innovators will operate in an 
integrated world market.  The north-south models divert attention to other issues rather 
than the incentives of the firms under two patent regimes. To focus specifically on the 
patent regimes and the corresponding R&D incentives of firms, we therefore assume 
away the issues of imitation, free-riding and spillovers.  We show that product patenting 
                                                           
3
 See, for instance, Chin and Grossman (1991), Deardorff (1990, 1991), Diwan and Rodrik (1991), Yang 
(1998), Kabiraj (2000), Kabiraj and Banerjee (2002), and Banerjee and Kabiraj (2011). Sakakibara and 
Branstetter (2001) provide an empirical study on the effect of patent protection on R&D innovation. 
4
 There is empirical literature that studies the relation between firm size and R&D expenditures on product- 
and process innovations. Generally the proportion of R&D expenditure on process innovation is larger for 
the large size of the firms. See, for instance, Fritsch and Meschede (2001) and Cohen and Klepper (1996). 
5
 The north-south set up presumes that the firms in the north and in the south have different types of R&D 
(say, creation versus imitation). But there are evidences to prove that southern firms have the ability to take 
up creative innovations. See Mathew and Mukherjee (2014), for instance. 
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will lead to a larger R&D investment. Under product patent regime, all successful firms 
will get patents if they have different products. But under process patenting regime, all 
firms, successfully inventing the same product, may get patents if they have different 
processes of production. Product patent is preferred because it lessens competition in the 
product market. 
 
Although there are a large number of papers prepared in the context of new 
international patent rules, only a few of them provide some theoretical analysis on 
product vs. process patenting. First, consider the works by Marjit and Beladi (1998) and 
Vishwasrao (1999). Both these papers have the north-south framework, but neither of 
these papers discusses the comparative R&D incentives under the two patenting regimes. 
In Marjit and Beladi, given the significant dispersion of income distribution across 
countries, under product patenting the northern firms may not cover all the southern 
markets. Process patenting, on the other hand, would lead to a lower price. Thus product 
patenting may result in a significant loss in terms of consumers’ surplus.  On the other 
hand, Vishwasrao derives welfare implications of both product and process patenting in 
the context of technology transfer. The paper also provides a comparative discussion of 
these two regimes. Recently, Mukherjee and Sinha (2013) have provided a theoretical 
model showing the conflicting interests of the northern and the southern governments and 
also the northern and the southern firms about the choice of patent regime. There are 
situations when the northern firms prefer process patent regime in the south. In another 
paper Mukherjee and Ray (2007) have studied the effect of product and process patents 
on firm profits and welfare. It is shown that, for small cost of imitation, each firm’s profit 
under process innovation falls but overall welfare is higher. However, in an infinitely 
repeated game framework, product patenting yields a larger welfare. 
 
In the present paper we discuss the incentive of a firm to invest in R&D under 
each of product patent and process patent regime. We consider a finite-good framework. 
Our framework seems to be apt for the drug industry where each such product is 
produced using many processes. As a result we observe many close drugs to exist for the 
same disease with possibly little variation in therapeutic values. We have already 
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illustrated this aspect. We show that under product patent regime the firms have larger 
incentives to invest in R&D. This is what is desired to be achieved under new 
international patent rules by switching from process to product patenting. Our paper also 
mitigates the apprehension that consumers will always be worse off. Not only will many 
new products be innovated under product patent regime, it may benefit the consumers as 
well. 
 
The layout of the paper is the following. In the second section we provide the 
model and results of the paper. Consumers’ welfare from patent protection is discussed in 
the third section. Finally, the fourth section is a conclusion. 
 
2.  Model 
 
Consider the following scenario. There are two firms interacting in R&D for 
product/process innovations. By product innovation we mean inventing a product along 
with a method of production. Consider that there are ‘n’ ( ≥ 2) conceivable non-
infringing products, , , … . , 
, which have the potential of getting innovated. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume that , , … . , 
 are independent. We further assume 
that the market demands for these products are the same and identical. 
 
Assume that there are m  alternative methods of producing each of these goods; 
2≥m . Therefore, the problem of each firm is to decide which product to invent and 
which process of production to select. The unit cost of producing each product 
corresponding to any process is assumed to be the same and constant.
6
 Thus, their 
selection of products may be matching (i.e., choosing the same product) or mismatching 
(i.e. choosing different products), and even if they select the same product, they may 
differ in respect of their choices of production processes. 
 
                                                           
6
 By this assumption we rule out the selection of a product on consideration of cost of production. 
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Now, given the outcomes of their R&D decisions, which innovations will be 
protected by patents depend on the existing patent rules. We consider two alternative 
patent regimes, viz., product patenting and process patenting. Under product patent 
regime, only one firm can get a patent for a product irrespective of its process of 
production. Thus, if both firms select two different products (this occurs with probability 
(( − 1)  ), any firm who comes up with the innovation will get the patent for its 
product. When both choose the same product (this occurs with probability 1  ) and only 
one firm succeeds, the successful firm gets the patent; but if both are successful, we 
assume that each firm gets the patent with probability one-half (1/2). On the other hand, 
under process patent regime, even if both firms choose the same product but two different 
processes of production, any successful firm can get the patent for its innovation. 
However, if they have the same process of production at the same time, then only one 
firm can get the patent and each firm gets the patent with probability one-half (1/2). Of 
course, when they choose different products, under either regime each product will get 
protection. 
 
      We assume that the R&D outcomes are probabilistic. The R&D technology for each 
product (associated with one method of production) is given by ℛ(, ), where ℛ is the 
resource cost of innovation associated with the success probability p , 10 << p  and 
 > 0 is a shift parameter. Let us assume ℛ = () and make the following 
assumption about the (. ) function. 
 
Assumption: The function is twice continuously differentiable with the properties: 
0(.) ≥′R , 0(.) >′′R , 0)0( =′R  and =∝′ )1(R . 
 
The above assumptions are fairly innocuous. The positive second derivative 
captures diminishing returns in R&D activity, while the familiar Inada-type end point 
conditions are imposed to ensure interior solutions. We further assume that each firm is 
risk-neutral. 
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We have the following game structure. In the first stage, each firm decides which 
product to produce, and given their choice of product, they also decide the process of 
production. In the second stage, the firms decide their R&D investment that determines 
the probability of success. Then at the end of this stage, given the outcomes of R&D, 
which firm or firms will be covered under patent protection is determined based on the 
prevailing patent rules. Finally, in the third stage, the firms compete in the product 
market as quantity setter. Given the assumptions about the market demand and cost of 
producing goods, we denote the monopoly payoff by M  and duopoly payoff of a firm by 
D  (when both firms compete with the same product); therefore, DM 2> . 
 
Finally, we assume that product choice by a firm is a random draw and 
independent. Given that there are ‘n’ products, therefore each firm chooses a product 
with probability 1  . Similarly, given the choice of a product, the choice of a process by 
the firm is again a random draw. Thus each process of production is chosen with 
probability,  
m/1 . 
 
2.1 Product Patent Regime 
       
Let us first consider the product patent regime.
7
 Denoting by ip  the probability 
that the i -th firm will come up with a success in R&D, the expected net payoff of firm i  
from its R&D decision will be given by, 
 
   ,  = 
 
 !
 " + 1 − "$ +

%

 " − (),     &, ' = 1,2;   & ≠ '     (1) 
                                              
The first term of the expression on the right hand side denotes the expected net 
revenue when both firms have chosen the same product, and the middle term is the 
                                                           
7
 For algebraic convenience we assume that the length of patent (either product or process) protection (T ) 
is 1. Obviously, there will be no qualitative change in the results of our analysis if 1>T  and finite (given 
any discounting rate).  
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expected profit when they choose two different products. The first order conditions 
satisfying the optimal R&D investment are 
 
     
 
!
 " + 1 − "$ +

%

 " = ′(),     &, ' = 1,2;   & ≠ '                            (2) 
 
We assume symmetric equilibrium, ppp ji == . Therefore, the optimal p  will be 
solved from the following condition, 
                                         *() ≡ " − ,
  = -()                                                     (3)                                                                                        
 
Note that the second order condition is necessarily satisfied. Further, )(pφ  is linear and 
downward sloping, with M=)0(φ  and  *(1) ≡ 
%
 ". Therefore Eqn. (2) gives a 
unique solution of pp ˆ= . 
 
2.2 Process Patent Regime 
 
Now suppose that only process patenting is available. Then the expected net 
payoff of a firm under process patenting is,  
 
 . ,  = 1 /
1
0 1

2 " + 1 − "2 +
0 − 1
0 34 + 1 − "56 
                                        + 
%
 " − (),     &, ' = 1,2;   & ≠ '                                   (4)                                                                
                                                                                                                                   
Note that in this case when both the firms choose the same product but different 
processes and when both are successful, both the firms get patent, and so the market is 
duopoly. The first order conditions for solving optimal success probability are, 
 
   1 /
1
0 1

2 " + 1 − "2 +
0 − 1
0 34 + 1 − "56 +
 − 1
 " 
                                   =   -(),     &, ' = 1,2;   & ≠ '                                                      (5) 
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Again, assuming symmetric equilibrium, ppp ji == , the optimal p  is solved from the 
following condition, 
 
                                7() ≡ " − 8,%9
 −
,%9
:
 ;  = -()                                         (6) 
 
Again, )( pϕ  is linear and downward sloping, with  
M=)0(ϕ   and   7(1) ≡
:(
%)<
:
 " +
(:%)
:
 4.  
 
Moreover, the second order condition is satisfied. Hence we shall get from Eqn. (6) the 
unique solution of pp ~= .  
 
2.3 Product vs. Process Patenting and R&D Incentives    
 
Given (3) and (6), we are now in a position to state the main result of the paper. 
 
Proposition 1: Product patenting provides a larger R&D incentive to the innovators than 
process patenting. 
 
Proof: Consider Eqns. (3) and (6). We have )(pR′  rising and each of )(pφ  and )( pϕ  
falling. Moreover, )0()0( ϕφ =  and 0 )()( >∀> ppp ϕφ . Therefore, we must have pp ~ˆ > . 
This proves the proposition.      QED  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The above result is demonstrated in Figure 1. The intuition is the following. 
When the firms choose different products, it does not matter whether it is a product patent 
regime or a process patent regime. But when they come up with the same product 
innovation, under product patenting only one firm is granted the patent for the product 
and so it emerges as monopoly, but under process patenting both the firms can get the 
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patent for the product if they have different processes of production. Thus process 
patenting leads to more competition whereas product patenting lessens product market 
competition.  
 
2.4 Some Observations 
 
We can make the following observations. First, the result underlying Proposition 
1 does not depend on m , except that we need 2≥m . Note that only p~  depends on m , 
but pˆ  is independent of m . Now, as m  increases, )( pϕ  shifts down for any given 
0>p , hence p~  falls. The reason is that as m  increases, chances of emerging as 
monopoly decreases, therefore incentives for innovation under process patenting fall. 
 
Second, suppose n  goes up, i.e., the number of conceivable products increases. 
From Eqn. (3) and (6) one can easily derive that 0
ˆ
>
dn
pd
 and 0
~
>
dn
pd
 i.e., R&D 
incentives under both product and process patenting go up. Geometrically, as n  
increases, both )(pφ  and )( pϕ  shift up resulting in an increase of both pˆ  and p
~ .  The 
intuition is simple. As n  goes up, probability of choosing the same product by both the 
firms falls, hence there is less chance of infringing on the other’s innovation.  So each 
investor will be willing to spend a larger amount on innovation. Now given that both pˆ  
and p~  are increasing in n  and that each of pˆ  and p
~  has an upper bound, hence as n  
becomes very large, distinction between product patenting and process patenting 
becomes blurred. This means, we have 0)~ˆ( =−
→∝
ppLt
n
. Geometrically, both the function 
)(pφ  and )( pϕ  tend to be horizontal and coincide. 
  
Third, if all conceivable products are assumed to be substitutes, our result will 
remain unchanged. When the choices of products are different, there is as such no 
difference between product patent and process patent in our case. The reason is that if we 
assume these goods to be substitute to each other, the middle terms of the right hand side 
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of Eqn. (1) and (4) will undergo a change, but in either case the middle terms will have 
the same expression.  
 
Fourth, if  is lower, i.e., if R&D becomes easy, )( pR′α  function in Figure 1 
shifts down. Since both )(pφ  and )( pϕ  are downward sloping and )( pR′α  is rising 
function, hence both p~  and pˆ  will increase.  
 
Fifth, in the model we have assumed quantity competition in the product market. 
Suppose that the firms compete in prices. One can then easily see that our results will go 
through. Under price competition with homogeneous goods we must have 0=D , and 
then again  0 )()( >∀> ppp ϕφ .  
 
Finally, in our structure, the firms have a lot to gain if the firms under 
consideration could cooperate and coordinate their product choices. Consider that each 
firm chooses a distinct product, say firm 1 chooses X  and firm 2  chooses Y . Then each 
firm chooses p  to maximize " − (). By choosing different products, each firm 
can generate monopoly profit with probability 1 (subject to successful innovation). 
Clearly, no firm has any incentive to mimic the other firm’s choice. If it would do so, it 
would mean that there would be positive probability to compete, which would only 
reduce the payoff from M toD . In this equilibrium there is no difference between the 
two regimes of patent protection. 
  
3. Consumers’ Welfare 
 
In this section we shall discuss the implication of product patenting vis-à-vis 
process patenting for the consumers. Those who favor process patenting often argue that 
product patenting will hurt the consumers by creating monopoly in different markets. 
This argument may however be contested because product patenting leads to higher 
investment in R&D. In our context we compare consumers’ surplus under these two 
patent regimes. 
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Let 
ms  and ds  denote consumers’ surplus in a market under monopoly and 
duopoly, respectively; therefore, 
md ss >  due to existence of the usual deadweight loss. 
If p  be the probability of success in equilibrium, then the expected consumers’ surplus 
under product patenting is: 
 
       => = 
 ?1 − (1 − )@A: +

%

 ?2 + 2(1 − )@A: =


 (2 − )A:              (7) 
 
Similarly, the expected consumers’ surplus under process patenting is given by 
 
    SC = 1n /
1
m F1 − (1 − p)
HsJ + m − 1m 3p
sK + 2p(1 − p)sJ56  
+ n − 1n ?2p
 + 2p(1 − p)@sJ 
                            = L p 1
%M
J + 2
J%
J (1 − p) + 2(n − 1)2 sJ +
J%
J psK$                   (8) 
 
Now compare (7) and (8) for the same values of p . Since md ss > , we must have 
)(ˆ)(
~
pSpS > , that is, for the same probability of success, process patenting generates 
larger consumers’ surplus. In equilibrium we have already shown in Proposition 1 that 
pp ~ˆ > . Moreover, from (7), 
NO>
N = 2
PQ

 ( − ) > 0; therefore  )(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ pSpS > for pp >ˆ . 
Hence, depending on the R&D function and other values we have the possibility that 
 )~(
~
)ˆ(ˆ pSpS > . To summarize, we can write the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: While product patenting always benefits the producers, consumers may 
also be benefited. 
 
Since product patenting provides a larger incentive for R&D, the firms will invest 
more in R&D under product patent than under process patent. This has a beneficial effect 
upon the consumers. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The new international patent rules have called for enforcing product patent across 
all countries. This has created a commotion among the developing countries which so far 
allowed only process patenting. Ultimately, the countries have signed the TRIPs 
agreement. It is argued that product patenting will encourage R&D, and therefore, all 
countries will benefit. This paper provides a framework to examine whether product 
patenting will generate a larger incentive to the innovators for doing R&D compared to 
process patenting. Since under process patenting all firms producing the same product, 
but with different processes, can get patent protection, process patenting will lead to more 
competition in the product market. Hence R&D investment will be less under process 
patenting. On the other hand, larger R&D investment enables larger or more innovations, 
hence consumers may gain in spite of having monopoly distortion in different markets 
due to product patenting. Finally, our paper has utilized the framework akin to drug 
industry; hence our results have implication for R&D issues in drug industry. 
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                     Figure 1: R&D incentives under two patent regimes 
